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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
This thesis proposes a new electronic voting (e-voting) scheme that fulfills all the 
security requirements of e-voting i.e. privacy, accuracy, universal verifiability, fairness, 
receipt-freeness, incoercibility, dispute-freeness, robustness, practicality and scalability; 
usually some of which are found to be traded. When compared with other existing schemes, 
this scheme requires much more simple computations and weaker assumptions about 
trustworthiness of individual election authorities. The key mechanism is the one that uses 
confirmation numbers involved in individual votes to make votes verifiable while disabling 
all entities including voters themselves to know the linkages between voters and their votes. 
Many current e-voting schemes extensively deploy zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) to achieve 
verifiability. However, ZKP is expensive and complicated. The confirmation numbers attain 
the verifiability requirement in a much more simple and intuitive way, then the scheme 
becomes scalable and practical.  
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 Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
 
Voting is the process, in which voters cast their votes while a group of authorities 
collects the votes and outputs the final tally. Conventional voting systems include papers, 
punch cards, mechanical levers, optical-scan machines etc. To decide successful candidates 
a paper ballot voting system records and counts votes of voters cast on paper sheets where 
paper sheets are produced by voters themselves, by political parties or by election 
authorities. In a punch card voting system, cards and a small clipboard-sized device are 
provided to record votes. Voters punch holes in cards at positions corresponding to their 
selected candidate using punch devices, and then the cards are placed in a ballot box for 
tabulation. In a mechanical lever voting system, the name of each candidate is assigned to a 
particular lever in a rectangular array of levers on the front of the machine. A set of printed 
strips visible to the voters indicate the lever assignment for each candidate and issue the 
choice. In an optical-scan machine voting system, optical scanners are used to read marked 
paper ballots and tally the results. Here voters mark their choices in locations corresponding 
to their choices usually by filling rectangles, circles, ovals, or by completing arrows. 
 
However, none of these conventional schemes can satisfy a truly secure and 
verifiable election while maintaining privacies of voters because they cannot prove their 
honest operations without revealing individual votes. Also, these systems are not efficient as 
they are conducted manually and therefore very often they are not accurate. As a 
consequence, extensive research is going on in the field of e-voting for last several decades 
for the purpose of substitution of these systems to establish the true democracy in societies. 
 
Unlike these systems, electronic voting (e-voting) systems based on computers, 
computer networks and cryptographic protocols, alleviate the limitations of conventional 
voting systems, and they enable efficient, accurate, verifiable and convenient elections. Also 
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the resources of e-voting schemes (e.g. the computing devices, the software and the 
communication mechanisms) are reusable, therefore e-voting based elections become 
inexpensive and economic. Moreover, they do not require any geographical proximity of 
voters (e.g. soldiers or employees working abroad can participate in elections) and they 
provide better scalability for large scale public elections [1]. The number of people those 
who usually do not participate in elections because of the inconveniences of conventional 
voting systems may be encouraged by the above conveniences of e-voting systems and 
thereby the number of vote castings can be maximized in elections.  
 
However e-voting schemes have potential problems that may degrade their 
acceptances. For examples, simple issuing of a unique identification number to each voter to 
smoothly verify the accuracy of elections would enable the authority (or authorities) to 
identify the linkages between voters and their votes and disclose the privacy of the voters 
[3]. When election authority issues receipts to voters to prove its honesty, coercers can force 
voters to follow their intentions more easily. On the other hand, complicated mechanisms 
that achieve complete anonymity of voters while maintaining verifiability of their votes 
make e-voting systems non-scalable and non-practical. For example, many election schemes 
involve zero knowledge proof (ZKP) (either interactive or non-interactive) to prove the 
correct behavior of entities e.g. to confirm that only eligible votes are accepted and all 
eligible votes are counted, however ZKP requires complicated computations and 
communications which make e-voting schemes unrealistic [17]. Also in many existing 
schemes, trustworthiness of authorities is assumed to conduct the election e.g. to generate 
and distribute tokens while registering the legitimate voters for the election, which lead to 
sacrifice privacy of voters and incoercibility. Likewise the assumption of the existence of 
trusted or absolutely trusted authority (or authorities) is not practical. Moreover, the vote 
formats of many existing e-voting schemes are not flexible, e.g. some of them can support 
only yes/no votes or simple one out of two candidate elections while some other schemes 
can support only pre-specified candidates elections. 
 
To make e-voting schemes acceptable they must satisfy extensive requirements 
related to privacy, verifiability, implementation, flexibility of vote formats and the 
assumptions about trustworthiness of involved authorities. E-voting schemes must satisfy 
even mutually contradictory requirements, and satisfying all of them altogether at the same 
time is highly challenging. 
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The objective of this research is to establish an e-voting scheme that fulfills all 
requirements for e-voting. The proposed e-voting scheme [17] in this research is 
characterized as follows, namely it  
1) satisfies all the security requirements of e-voting systems i.e. privacy, accuracy, 
universal verifiability, fairness, receipt-freeness, incoercibility, dispute-freeness, 
robustness, practicality and scalability [1, 8, 15]; which are usually found as traded in 
existing e-voting schemes, 
2) the scheme is based on the weaker assumptions about trustworthiness of entities, i.e. no 
one can make the scheme unreliable if at least one authority is honest among multiple 
authorities, and 
3) it enables flexible candidate selection i.e. it accepts freely chosen write-in ballots, votes 
for pre-specified or t out of l choices as well as yes/no votes. 
 
1.2 Overview of the field 
 
Based on adopted cryptographic techniques, existing e-voting schemes can be 
classified into three categories: blind signature based schemes [2, 3, 4], homomorphic 
encryption based schemes [5, 6, 7] and mixnet based schemes [8, 9, 10]. A lot of hybrid of 
homomorphic encryption and mixnet based schemes [11, 12, 13] are also available. Besides 
these schemes, paper based cryptographic voting schemes [14, 15, 16] that rely on visual 
cryptography have been proposed. However, existing schemes are unable to satisfy all the 
essential requirements of e-voting systems at the same time because there are tradeoffs 
among the individual requirements and constraints are remarkable. Also to achieve the 
verifiability of votes or to prove the honest behaviors of voting authorities, almost all of 
these schemes extensively deploy ZKP, which is expensive, not efficient and not practical 
enough, because it requires complicated computations and communications. For example, 
homomorphic encryption based schemes use ZKP to prove the validity of votes and their 
correct decryptions, and mixnet based voting schemes use ZKP to prove the correctness of 
operation of each mix-server. Therefore currently available e-voting systems can satisfy 
only a part of the requirements of voting and also they are non-scalable and non-practical. 
 
1.3 Overview of the proposed e-voting scheme 
 
Key mechanisms of the e-voting scheme proposed in this thesis are confirmation 
numbers (CNs), signature pairs on encrypted votes and those on blinded tokens. Here CNs 
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are publicly disclosed and registered unique numbers and they are attached to votes of 
individual voters, and a pair of signatures on encrypted votes ensure the authenticity of these 
encrypted votes. The other component signature pairs on blinded tokens enable voters to act 
anonymously. 
 
CNs involved in individual votes make votes verifiable while disabling all entities 
including voters themselves to know the linkages between voters and their votes. CNs are 
unique registered numbers and they are encrypted by multiple entities independently, so that 
no one knows their exact values. Therefore anyone can convince itself the authenticity of 
votes when attached CNs are the registered ones. Nevertheless any link between voters and 
their votes is removed because no one knows the decrypted forms of CNs attached to voters. 
Also publicly disclosed encrypted CNs ensure that all votes from eligible voters are counted, 
and thereby maintain the total accuracy of the election while protecting all privacies of 
voters. Different from ZKP, a mechanism for CNs is simple enough, it requires much less 
computations for individual entities without assuming any absolutely trustworthy election 
authority. Because of CNs this scheme requires much more simple computations for election 
entities in comparison with other existing schemes. The proposed scheme does not need any 
extra proof of correctness of votes. Therefore it is possible to develop e-voting systems that 
satisfy all the requirements including scalability and practicality.  
 
A signature pair of multiple managers on encrypted vote proves the authenticity of 
vote even when the decryption of encrypted vote reveals a disrupted result. Namely, anyone 
can convince itself that the vote is meaningless from the beginning when two different 
signatures on the vote reveal the same value, because no one can forge two different 
signatures consistently without conspiring with all managers. 
 
Signature pairs on blinded tokens enable voters to act without disclosing their 
identities i.e. anonymously. Although the signatures on token assigned to voter prove its 
eligibility, token does not reveal voter because managers sign on it blindly. The first 
signature of the pair is used for vote casting and the second one is used for approving the 
vote registration. Because the two signatures are generated by different signing keys, voter 
can prove its eligibility by the second one even after the first one had been publicly 
disclosed. 
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1.4 Organization of the thesis 
 
In Chap. 2 the requirements of e-voting schemes are introduced with the related 
works. Then, the security components are discussed in Chap. 3. The configuration of the 
proposed e-voting scheme that consists of voters, a single Voting manager, multiple 
mutually independent Tallying managers and Disruption detection manager is discussed in 
Chap 4. Chapter 5 provides the precise descriptions of the individual stages of the scheme, 
and Chapter 6 evaluates the proposed scheme. Namely, behaviors of the scheme are 
analyzed against various kind of security threats and the computation volumes required for 
carrying out the scheme are evaluated. The proposed scheme showed substantially better 
performance than existing schemes that rely on ZKP; which proves that the proposed 
scheme is scalable and practical enough. Finally Chap. 7 summarizes the work. 
 Chapter 2 
 
Requirements and Related Works 
 
This chapter discusses the requirements of e-voting systems and the related works 
while summarizing the contributions of the proposed scheme.  
 
2.1 Requirements of e-voting schemes 
 
E-voting schemes need to satisfy extensive requirements, some requirements are 
conflicting with others and there are tradeoffs among them. Because of these features of 
requirements, voting is one of the most challenging applications of information security 
technologies. Ideal e-voting schemes should satisfy the following requirements [1, 8, 15]. 
 
 Eligibility: As the most primitive requirement for conducting reliable elections, 
only persons who meet certain pre-determined criteria e.g. who have citizenships 
are allowed to cast permitted number of votes. To achieve this, authority needs to 
verify the eligibility of voters and record their casting votes.  
 
 Privacy: Usually voters do not want others including election authorities to know 
their casting votes. Therefore, anyone must not be able to know votes except its 
own vote. To achieve this, any traceability between voters and their votes must be 
removed during the whole election, i.e. it is necessary to conceal the identity of 
voters or votes at every stage of the election. 
 
 Accuracy: In elections, voters expect that their votes are correctly captured and that 
all eligible votes are correctly tallied. Accuracy is the degree of satisfactions of 
voters’ this expectation, and can be maintained by the verifiability mentioned 
below. 
 
 Verifiability: Verifiability is the ability to determine whether only and all valid 
votes are counted in final tally or not i.e. to determine the accuracy of the election. 
Chapter 2: Requirements and Related Works 
Accuracy of the election can be verified in two ways, one is the individual 
verifiability where only voters can verify their own votes in the tally. Therefore 
accuracy of the election consists of n voters is ensured when there are less than or 
equal to n votes and all n voters verify their votes. The other is universal 
verifiability which enables any third party to verify the accuracy of the election. 
 
 Fairness: In order to conduct the impartial election, anyone is not allowed to 
compute the partial tally before the end of the election which may influence the 
remaining voters and may affect the voting result. Some voting schemes trust that 
the authorities will not reveal partial tally e.g. [7, 8], but practical solutions must 
exclude this kind of assumptions. 
 
 Receipt-freeness: Receipt-freeness disables anyone including voters themselves to 
link voters to their votes, in order to protect voters from being coerced to follow 
intentions of other entities. To achieve receipt-freeness, the voting system should 
not leave any information about votes to voters. Also, votes should not include any 
information peculiar to the voters. If a vote includes some traceable information 
regarding the corresponding voter, this information can work as the receipt. When 
the receipt-freeness is not ensured, e-voting systems enable entities to easily gather 
data about voters and their votes and link them each other, therefore e-voting 
schemes cannot be used for real political elections without satisfying receipt-
freeness. In some voting schemes, authorities assign random numbers to voters to 
be put in their votes e.g. [5, 6, 7] and cannot achieve receipt-freeness completely 
because authorities can easily link voters to their votes based on these random 
numbers. Receipt-freeness shares the same notion with privacy. 
 
 Incoercibility: Incoercibility protects voters against coercers who can communicate 
with the voters actively. Incoercibility must cope with randomization, forced-
abstention and simulation attacks.  
 Randomization attacks force voters to submit invalid votes by manipulating 
the manner in which votes are cast.  
 Forced-abstention attacks enable coercers to force voters to abstain from 
casting their votes, and 
 Simulation attacks let coercers impersonate valid voters at some stage of 
the voting scheme and submit votes on their behalf.  
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Receipt-freeness property does not imply incoercibility but incoercible schemes 
must be receipt-free. 
 
 Dispute-freeness: To conduct elections in environments where even dishonest 
voters are involved, disputes between entities should be solved without involving 
irrelevant entities. The notion of universal verifiability is similar to dispute-
freeness but it is limited to the voting and tallying stages. 
 
 Robustness: Any entity should not be able to disrupt the voting, i.e. the voting 
system must be able to detect dishonest entities and to complete the voting process 
without the help of detected dishonest entities. 
 
 Scalability: In order to enable large scale elections, a scheme has to be extended 
easily while satisfying computation, communication, and storage requirements of 
the scheme. 
 
 Practicality: A scheme should not have assumptions and requirements that are 
difficult to implement. 
 
Among these requirements, some are usually satisfied and their implementation is not 
hard, but some others are difficult to satisfy. Especially satisfying several hard requirements 
altogether at the same time is really difficult because there are tradeoffs among them. For 
example, achieving incoercibility leads to sacrificing universal verifiability and hence 
accuracy because incoercible schemes conceals the links between voters and their votes 
while vote submission. As another example, satisfying dispute-freeness makes schemes 
complicated [1] because for every stage of the election, dispute-free schemes need to prove 
the validity of all actions of all involved entities and consequently schemes become 
impractical or unscalable. Also write-in ballots clash with the properties of receipt-freeness 
of universally verifiable schemes and randomization attacks (already discussed, which 
means to force a voter to vote in a certain way). Here write-in ballots are ballots in which a 
voter can insert a freely chosen message - a right protected in certain legislations and 
jurisdictions. [13]. Herein, peculiar information inserted within write-in ballots can be used 
as receipts of their corresponding voters, and thereby coercers can mount randomization 
attack by manipulating voters to submit invalid votes.  
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 On the other hand sacrificing one requirement sometimes also leads to sacrificing 
another one or more requirements because they are mutually dependent and interrelated. For 
example, the maximal level of privacy preservation and fairness has the same notion against 
corrupt authorities. Because, maximal privacy offers the privacy of a voter to be breached 
only with a collusion of all remaining entities e.g. voters and authorities, and while desirable, 
requires all the voters to either participate in the post-vote-casting stage or to mandatorily 
cast their votes (i.e. no abstaining). In this situation, breaching the privacy of voters enables 
corrupted authorities to modify or reveal the partial tally. 
 
Because of these, many existing e-voting schemes can satisfy only a part of the above 
requirements. For example, voting scheme proposed in [19] can satisfy privacy, accuracy, 
fairness, universal verifiability, dispute-freeness and practicality, but it cannot satisfy either 
of robustness, receipt-freeness, incoercibility or scalability. But e-voting systems must cope 
with intrinsic tradeoffs among these requirements. 
 
2.2 Related works  
 
E-voting schemes proposed and developed up to now, can be classified into three 
major categories: Schemes in the first category are cryptographic voting schemes e.g. [2, 3, 
6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13] and they are based on cryptographic algorithms without any specific 
hardware devices. Schemes in the second category are based on visual cryptographic 
algorithms and papers, and they are called paper based cryptographic voting schemes e.g. 
[14, 15, 16]. The third category is the commercial e-voting scheme e.g. [28, 29, 30] and 
schemes in this category are based on cryptographic techniques and machines like optical 
scan voting machine, direct/digital-recording electronic (DRE) etc. 
 
This thesis discusses a scheme in the first category, and as already discussed in 
Chap 1, there are three approaches to developing cryptographic voting schemes, they are (i) 
blind signature, (ii) mixnet and (iii) homomorphic encryption based schemes.  
 
According to how voters submit their votes to the tallying authority (or authorities), 
[1] has classified e-voting schemes as: hidden voter, in which voters anonymously submit 
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their votes; hidden vote, in which voters openly submit their encrypted votes; and hidden 
voter with hidden vote, in which voters anonymously submit their encrypted votes. 
 
2.2.1 Blind signature based schemes 
 
Blind signature is a digital signature scheme that allows an entity to get the 
signature on a message without revealing the content of the message. Therefore it can be 
used to authenticate a vote without knowing the content of it. When combined with 
anonymous channel, blind signature can achieve maximal privacy property [1].  
 
Herein, voters encrypt their votes before presenting them to the election authority 
for validation, and after the authority validates their votes, voters decrypt the encrypted 
signed votes in order to reveal signed votes [13]. The protocol proceeds as follows: 
Step 1: Voter Vj blinds its vote vj to E(aj, vj) by using its secret encryption key aj and sends 
it to the authority (or authorities) TM. 
te vj. 
Step 2: TM verifies the eligibility of Vj and then signs on E(aj, vj) i.e. generates S(Xi, E(aj, 
vj)) by using its signing key Xi and sends it to Vj. 
Step 3: Finally, Vj unblinds S(Xi, E(aj, vj)) and verifies the signature of TM i.e. generates 
S(Xi, vj), which is the signature on vo
 
Schemes based on blind signature are simple, efficient, and flexible. They enable 
voters to cast any form of votes including freely chosen write-in ballots. Usually they 
possess the fairness property because votes are blinded and authorities are unable to 
compute the partial tally. The limitations of these schemes are: usually they cannot satisfy 
receipt-freeness, because voter’s blind factor can be used as a receipt of its vote; and the 
voter can prove its vote to buyers [8]. Also, they cannot satisfy universal verifiability 
because votes are encrypted by the corresponding voters and votes can be verified only by 
their voters. Moreover the involvement of voters in the post-voting i.e. tallying stage 
sacrifices practicality. Besides, these schemes assume the existence of anonymous channels 
between voters and authorities which is impractical because usually an anonymous channel 
is implemented using mixnet which is inefficient. From the beginning, if a secure mixnet is 
available, a blind signature is not required anymore [8]. 
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2.2.2 Mixnet based schemes 
 
Mixnet enables a set of senders to send their messages while concealing their 
identity i.e. anonymously, thus it is a primitive component to provide entities with services 
while not knowing their identities. It consists of multiple mix-servers and takes a set of 
encrypted messages as its input and produces a new form of representation of the same 
messages through either decryption or by encryption operations and indistinguishable 
shuffling. At stage i, a batch of inputs are received by mix-server Mi and Mi transforms 
inputs by using either decryption key or by re-encryption, shuffles and transfers to mix-
server Mi + 1 to proceed to stage i + 1. The original proposal of the mixnet was a decryption 
mixnet, but many recent works deal with re-encryption mixnet, since it can separate mixing 
and decryption phases, which provides more flexibility, robustness, and efficiency. Here it is 
noticed that RSA [24] based mixnet requires the voter to perform n encryptions where n is 
the number of mix-servers.  
 
Mixnets can also be classified into verifiable mixnet and optimistic mixnet 
depending on mechanisms to prove the correctness of their behaviors. In verifiable mixnet 
while votes are disclosed, each mix-server provides proofs of its correct shuffling and thus 
the correctness of mixing is publicly verifiable. On the other hand, in optimistic mixnet the 
verification of correct shuffling is not provided by each mix-server. Instead, the correctness 
of the shuffling of the whole mixnet is verified after the mixnet outputs the shuffling results 
in plaintexts. Drawbacks of optimistic mixnets include that a cheating server cannot be 
identified instantly and some outputs are revealed in plaintexts even when the shuffling is 
incorrect [8]. 
 
Schemes based on mixnet are flexible i.e. there is no stringent limitations on vote 
formats, it can support any vote format either pre-specified or unspecified i.e. write in 
ballots. However, schemes based on mixnet are complicated and generally not efficient in 
practical implementations because it requires a heavy processing load during the tallying 
process which makes it slow, and it also requires a huge amount of computations for 
proving the correctness of shuffling and re-encryptions or decryptions i.e. the correctness of 
behaviors of mix-servers. Without the proof of correctness, schemes based on mixnet cannot 
conduct an accurate election and cannot provide the privacy of voters. 
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2.2.3 Homomorphic encryption based schemes 
 
An encryption function E(K, x) is said to be homomorphic, if encrypted forms of m1 
and m2, i.e. E(K, m1) and E(K, m2) satisfy the relation E(K, m1 ◎ m2) = E(K, m1) ◎ E(K, 
m2) for some operation ◎ . The operation ◎  can be a modular addition (, additive 
homomorphism) or multiplication (, multiplicative homomorphism). Homomorphic voting 
schemes apply certain properties of probabilistic cryptosystems where correspondence 
between a plaintext and a ciphertext exists between a certain group in the plaintext space 
and the group in the ciphertext space [13]. RSA [24], ElGamal [25] and Paillier [26] etc. 
well-known asymmetric or public key cryptosystems possesses multiplicative 
homomorphism. Homomorphic encryption provides a mechanism to directly combine the 
encrypted votes to get an encrypted tally. The mechanism of homomorphic encryption based 
voting scheme is as follows:  
 
Voter Vj posts a vote while encrypting it to hide the linkage between the voter and 
its vote (privacy). Then the tally is obtained by decrypting the sum or the products of them. 
However, validity of the encrypted votes has to be ensured before combining them. The 
voter is therefore required to provide an interactive or non-interactive ZKP of validity of its 
vote. The general form of the vote that Vj posts is:  {E(K, (vj || rj)), proofj} where K is the 
public key of a probabilistic homomorphic encryption scheme, vj is the vote, proofj is a 
proof of validity of the vote. After verifying the proofs of votes, the tallying authority 
computes: ∏ j E(K, vj) = E(K, {∑ j vj, ∏ j rj}) or E(K, {∑ j vj, ∑ j rj}) due to the 
homomorphism of encryption E. The authority needs to post decrypted tally ∑j vj and a 
proof of correct decryption. Using the posted quantities on the public broadcast channel, 
anyone can compute and verify tally to be valid, thus achieving universal verifiability.  
 
Importantly, it is very easy for homomorphic voting schemes to satisfy universal 
verifiability as well as accuracy property. Another advantage is that there is no requirement 
for any form of mixnet. However the encoding of vote is limited i.e. not flexible [1], it 
cannot support write-in ballots, can support simple binary choices i.e. yes/no votes and votes 
for pre-specified candidates, and the use of intensive ZKP to prove the validity of ballot in 
the voting stage is costly for the voter [7, 8]. Also, because of the involvement of huge 
ZKPs, schemes sacrifices scalability and practality. 
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2.3 Receipt-free schemes 
 
 Among various security requirements, many mixnet and homomorphic encryption 
based schemes emphasize on receipt-freeness and incoercibility, because although they are 
difficult to satisfy, they are essential for voting. Receipt-freeness disables voters to prove 
their votes to any entity in order to achieve incoercibility. To achieve receipt-freeness, many 
voting schemes [5, 6, 7] attach secret random numbers to votes while proving the 
correctness of votes by using interactive-ZKP (IZKP) or non-interactive-ZKP (NIZKP). In 
order to generate secret random numbers, these schemes assume some kind of trusted 
authorities and rely on some physical assumptions about the communication channels 
between the voter and the authorities e.g. one-way untappable channels from voters to the 
authorities, one-way untappable channels from the authorities to voters and two-way 
untappable channels (voting booth) between voters and the authorities.  
 
Voting scheme proposed in [5] implemented receipt-freeness in homomorphic 
encryption based voting scheme. But because of IZKP involved in individual voter’s vote 
while a voter casts its vote, every voter has to wait for all other voters to finish their IZKP 
phases which make the scheme unscalable. Moreover it was demonstrated that this voting 
scheme could not satisfy receipt-freeness. A voting scheme based on homomorphic 
encryption and multiple authorities achieves receipt-freeness [6] while assuming the 
existence of an untappable channel from each authority to each voter so that authorities can 
jointly generate random numbers for voters to construct their ballots. Voting scheme 
proposed in [8] presented another receipt-free e-voting scheme based on re-encryption 
mixnet protocols with a tamper-resistant randomizer (TRR), a hardware device generates the 
random numbers for voters to be used to construct their ballots.  
 
 All of these schemes exploit ZKP to attain verifiability. However ZKP that requires 
non negligable computations makes the schemes impractical. Also untappable channels used 
in [6] make the scheme unrealistic, i.e. the scheme sacrifices practicality and scalability. A 
worse thing is that the scheme cannot achieve the complete receipt-freeness. Namely, 
authorities can know the random numbers and can know links between voters and their 
votes. Although TRR, a secure hardwire device such as smart card or Java card to generate 
random numbers for voters used in [8], achieves the complete anonymity of voters, TRR 
further worsens its practicality because TRR is not applicable to general re-encryption 
mixnets where voter needs to provide the proof of knowledge of its secret random number 
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used to construct its vote.  
 
2.4 Incoercible Schemes 
 
 Several incoercible e-voting schemes also had been proposed [11, 12, 13]. In these 
schemes, voters obtain unique tokens provided by trusted authorities and construct their 
encrypted votes while combining with the encrypted tokens, to submit multiple votes 
without being traced by others. Election result is computed while comparing a list of 
encrypted tokens (prepared by the authorities) with a list of encrypted votes. As a 
consequence, coercers cannot identify exact votes of voters. However, ZKP to confirm the 
equivalence of tokens corresponded to multiple votes of same voters, sacrifices practicality 
and scalability.  
 
Schemes proposed in [12, 13] allow a voter to cast multiple votes with the same 
token and authority consider only one encrypted vote per token for decryption. Scheme 
proposed in [12] includes two NIZKP processes; one for the token verifications and another 
for the vote verifications. First it verifies the correctness of token; therefore a voter can 
submit the same valid token with its vote multiple times. Voting scheme proposed in [13] 
improves [12] by accommodating write-in votes and by simplifying the computational 
burden necessary for voters and in [13] pre-determined policy e.g. timestamps removes the 
duplicate tokens of the same voter. It allows voters to combine their votes with their tokens 
by applying homomorphic encryption property. Authorities post the token shares of voters 
on BB needed for tallying and also send the same tokens to the registered voters with a 
designated verifier ZKP to prove the equivalence of these tokens. Like token, authorities 
also create the shares of permissible ballots which voters can cast in the election. These 
shares are encrypted with two different public parameters and are posted on BB together 
with NIZKP to prove that each pair of ciphertexts are encryptions of the same underlying 
share of ballot. Although both [12] and [13] schemes have achieved incoercibility; 
unfortunately scalability, universal verifiability and accuracy properties are traded for it i.e. 
for ZKP. Also the anonymous broadcast channel with no designated section on the BB in 
[12, 13] is also difficult to implement [1] and it sacrifices universal verifiability property. 
 
A scheme proposed in [11] employs an observer that serves as a convenient and 
secure transport to facilitate the registration and voting for the benefit of the voter. It also 
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simplifies the time consuming verification processes at the tallying stage but still involves 
ZKP to disable voters to transfer encrypted forms of their tokens to others, and NIZKP to 
prove the correctness of encryption of votes. 
 
2.5 Voting schemes in other categories 
 
2.5.1 Paper based schemes 
 
Regarding paper based cryptographic voting schemes, visual cryptography based 
schemes had been proposed [14, 15, 16]. Voting scheme proposed in [14] achieved receipt-
freeness innovatively and used robust decryption mixnet. Here, voter first fills out its ballot, 
physically splits it into two pre-determined halves, destroys one, and casts the other while 
taking a copy of this same half to home with itself as a receipt. But because of mixnet 
involved in it, inaccuracies can be produced which may lead to an unfair re-election [1] and 
election officials with the proper secret keys can recover voter’s choice during the tallying 
process. As paper ballot, voter needs to verify its ballot prior voting to ensure that the two 
halves of the ballot are consistent with one another. Without this verification, a fraudulently 
created ballot could corrupt the proper recording of the voter’s intent. In voting scheme 
proposed in [15] the ballots are self-contained i.e. any one including voter itself, can audit 
the ballot without interacting with election officials before voter casting its ballot. Also 
NIZKP generated by election officials prove the correctness of proper ballots. 
 
 However, in these systems, voters must delegate their vote computations to the 
voting booth, therefore the voting booth can know the votes of voters, by which the privacy 
of voters may be breached. Also paper ballots prepared in advance by either single or 
multiple authorities do not guarantee privacy against the ballot creators. Although a solution 
exists for the privacy problems with respect to the voting booth [16], it involves NIZKP to 
prove the correctness of votes. In it, voter uses computer device only at the preprocessing 
stage but voting itself is done bare-handedly like [14, 15] etc. Here for every candidate voter 
itself encrypts two ballots along with a NIZKP from which one ballot is selected and 
published on BB. Now voter casts its vote for a candidate and sent it to the booth which is 
not published on BB. Voting booth re-encrypts the remaining ballot twice and publish on BB. 
The scheme achieves incoercibility, unforgeability, true privacy with bounded candidates 
and vote is not revealed to even to the booth. But it assumes the existence of recordable 
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private channel which is an impractical assumption to implement, and it cannot solve 
disputes between voters and the booth.  
 
2.5.2 Commercial schemes 
 
 Commercial e-voting systems have produced many high-profile software and 
hardware e.g. optical scan voting machine, direct/digital-recording electronic (DRE) voting 
machine etc. However herein, the operational and procedural errors that can occur during 
elections is quite large. In practice, it has been observed that these hardware machines 
produce anomalies like under-votes, ambiguous audit, choices “flipping” before the voter’s 
eyes etc. Also, it has been reported that they have their deficiencies in design and 
implementation, therefore not secure. Security flaws, software bugs, operational errors and 
mistakes, incorrect configuration, mechanical failure of these hardware and poor human 
factors of the ballot design etc. make these voting systems inoperable to conduct real world 
elections. Sometimes, the total arrangement of these hardware for voting, increases 
mechanical complexity, maintenance burden and failure rates of these machines. Although, 
NIZKP involved in these systems can prevent a voting machine from grossly stuffing ballots, 
they cannot prevent a voting machine from flipping votes from one candidate to another 
[28]. 
 
However, some research is going on to develop user interface of these hardware 
from pre-rendered graphics, reducing runtime code size as well as allowing the voter’s exact 
voting experience to be examined well before the election.  
 
2.6 Contributions of this scheme 
 
 To enable e-voting to satisfy all requirements, the proposed scheme uses CNs. 
Namely, CNs that are unique and registered in the system are attached to individual votes 
while being encrypted so that no one knows their exact values. Therefore votes can be 
verified by checking the attached CNs, nevertheless any link between voters and their votes 
are removed. CNs also ensure that all votes from eligible voters are counted, and thereby 
maintain the total accuracy of the election. 
 
 Different from ZKP, a mechanism for CNs is simple enough, it requires much less 
computations for individual entities without assuming any absolutely trustworthy entity. 
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Therefore it is possible to develop e-voting systems that satisfy all the requirements 
including scalability and practicality. 
 
 Although several voting schemes [5, 6, 7] had already used unique numbers as 
tokens to make votes verifiable, but they only prove the correctness of individual votes, do 
not ensure that all votes from eligible voters are counted. Moreover, these schemes require 
trusted entities that know the values of tokens; therefore complete privacy or incoercibility 
is not achieved. 
 Chapter 3 
 
Security Components 
 
This chapter describes the key security components used in the proposed voting 
scheme. They are bulletin board (BB), blind signature, signature pairs on blinded tokens, 
mixnet like encryption and decryption shuffles, confirmation numbers (CNs), signature pairs 
on encrypted votes, a probabilistic and commutative re-encryption mechanism and an 
anonymous authentication mechanism. Here except the BB, mixnet, blind signature and 
anonymous authentication mechanism, other components are newly developed for the 
proposed voting scheme to satisfy all the requirements of e-voting. 
 
3.1 Newly developed components 
 
3.1.1 Confirmation numbers (CNs) 
 
 Confirmation numbers (CNs) are unique and registered numbers and they are 
assigned to individual voters to make votes verifiable. Because all CNs are publicly 
disclosed, anyone can convince itself that votes attached by CNs are the ones submitted in 
the authorized way. Also by examining the used CNs, anyone can confirm that all submitted 
votes are counted. On the other hand, CNs are attached to votes while being encrypted so 
that no one can know their decrypted forms. Therefore, anyone including voters themselves 
cannot link voters to their votes attached by CNs.  
 
 To conceal the content of CCj (confirmation number assigned to voter Vj) from any 
entity including Vj itself, firstly a single entity generates N different encrypted CNs for N 
voters in advance as shown in Fig. 3.1 (a). Then P (at least two) mutually independent 
election authorities repeatedly perform encryptions and shuffles of all CNs by using their 
encryption keys, i.e. firstly the first election authority TM1 encrypts CCj to CCj' to be placed 
in random positions as shown in Fig. 3.1 (b). Then other mutually independent election 
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authorities i.e. TM2, TM3, --- execute the same operations repeatedly, i.e. CCj' is further 
converted to CCj'', CCj''',--- as shown in Fig. 3.1 (c) and (d). Therefore, no entity can identify 
the linkage between original CCj and its encrypted form unless multiple election authorities 
conspire i.e. no one including Vj itself can identify Vj from CCj.  
 
 Here CCj' = E(K1, CCj), CCj'' = E(K2, CCj'), CCj''' = E(K3, CCj''),---, provided that x is 
encrypted to E(Ki, x) by the encryption key Ki of the i’th election authority TMi. In the 
following repeatedly encrypted CCj is denoted as E(K*, CCj), i.e. E(K*, CCj) = E(KP, E(KP-1, 
--- E(K1, CCj) --- )). This multiple encryption is carried out based on the probabilistic and 
commutative re-encryption scheme described in Sec 3.1.3. 
 
C1 C2 ... CCj ... CN
(a) a set of N unique numbers (b) 1st encryption and shuffle
C2' ...CCj' ... CN' C1'
(c) 2nd encryption and shuffle
... CCj''...C1'' CN'' C2''
(d) 3rd encryption and shuffle
... CCj''' ...CN''' C1'''C2'''
 
Fig. 3.1 Encryption steps of confirmation numbers 
 
3.1.2 Signature pairs on encrypted votes 
 
 Signature pairs on encrypted votes prove the authenticity of votes and the honesty of 
all election managers, i.e. when managers are honest they can disable anyone to blame them 
for vote disruptions. In the proposed scheme v*, repeatedly encrypted form of vote v, put and 
verified by the corresponding voter Vj is decrypted to v by multiple mutually independent 
election managers TM1, ---, TMP, and to protect v* from unauthorized modifications, 
multiple election managers repeatedly sign on v* by their signing keys {M1, M2, ---, MP} to 
generate S(M*, v*) = S(MP, S(MP-1, ---, S(M1, v*) --- )) before the decryptions, where S(Mi, 
x) is the signature of TMi on x generated by its signing key Mi.  Namely, when encrypted 
signed form S(M*, v*) is successfully decrypted to signed form S(M*, v), anyone can 
convince itself that multiple election managers had honestly decrypted S(M*, v*).  
 
 However, this scheme is effective only when all voters put meaningful votes. When 
decryption result is meaningless, entities cannot determine whether multiple election 
managers are dishonest or v is meaningless from the beginning. A signature pair on v* solves 
this problem. When each election manager signs on v* by its two different signing keys M(1)i 
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and M(2)i as shown in Fig. 3.2, it is impossible to consistently generate two different signed 
forms S(M(1)*, v) = S(M(1)P, S(M(1)P-1, ---, S(M(1)1, v) --- )) and S(M(2)*, v) = S(M(2)P, S(M(2)P-1, 
---, S(M(2)1, v) --- )) in unauthorized ways because no one knows all signing keys. Namely, 
anyone can convince itself that multiple election managers had decrypted S(M(1)*, v*) to 
S(M(1)*, v) honestly, when two forms S(M(1)*, v*) and S(M(2)*, v*) reveal the signatures on the 
same v. These signatures are also generated based on the probabilistic and commutative re-
encryption scheme. 
 
S(M
(1)*
, v) = S(M
(1)P
, S(M
(1)P-1
, ---, S(M
(1)1
, v) --- ))
S(M
(2)*
, v) = S(M
(2)P, S(M(2)P-1, ---, S(M(2)1, v) --- ))
 
Fig. 3.2 Signature pairs on encrypted votes 
 
3.1.3 Probabilistic and commutative re-encryptions  
 
Existing encryption algorithms are not commutative. Actually RSA is commutative 
[24], however it is commutative only when all encryptions are carried out based on the same 
modulo p arithmetic, therefore not applicable to re-encryption schemes. Namely in RSA, 
data x is encrypted into E(k1, x) = x
k1 
(mod p) by encryption key k1, therefore E(k2, E(k1, x)) 
= (x
k1
)
k2 
(mod p) = x
k1k2 
(mod p), the encrypted form of x generated by authorities TM1 and 
TM2, can be decrypted regardless of the key application order. However, when TM1’s 
encryption key k1 is disclosed, it is easy for TM2 to calculate TM1’s decryption key k1
-1
, 
from the relation k1k1
-1 
(mod p = k) 
tions. 
2k2
-1 
(mod p). To disable authorities to calculate 
decryption keys of other authorities, individual encryption algorithms must adopt different 
modulo arithmetic, and the resulting re-encryption scheme becomes not commutative. The 
other typical encryption algorithm ElGamal [25] is not commutative from the beginning 
[22]. Although in re-encryption mixnet based on ElGamal, the commutative property exists, 
it is not suitable for the proposed e-voting scheme because it requires ZKP for verifying 
correct encryp
 
 A multiple encryption and signature scheme for votes and CNs described in Secs. 
3.1.1 and 3.1.2 can be implemented based on the probabilistic encryption algorithm with 
homomorphic and commutative properties, proposed in [22]. In the election, different voters 
may choose the same candidates, therefore the encryption function must be probabilistic; if 
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not probabilistic, same candidates are encrypted into same forms, and a voter can know 
votes of other voters who had chosen the same candidate even they are encrypted. Also to 
ensure the authenticity of votes, the encryption and signing algorithms must be commutative. 
When they are not commutative, the signed form of encrypted vote S(M*, E(K*, v)) cannot 
be decrypted to S(M*, v). 
 
 To use re-encryption scheme proposed in [22], each election authority TMi defines 
its encryption and decryption key pairs {Ki, Fi} and {Hi, Gi}, while selecting two large 
appropriate integers p1 and p2, where for any integer u and w, uKiFi (mod p1) = u (mod p1) 
and wHiGi (mod p2) = w (mod p2). Then election authority TMi encrypts x to E({Ki, Hi}, x) = 
{E(Ki, xr) = (xr)Ki, E(Hi, r) = rHi} while mixing x with random secret number r as shown in 
Fig. 3.3 i.e. the encrypted form consists of a pair of data part E(Ki, xr) and a randomixation 
part E(Hi, r). Here, the key pairs are kept as TMi 's secrets, in order to enable each TMi to 
securely use its key pairs under the environment where multiple election authorities share 
the same modulo arithmetic. When key Ki of election authority TMi is disclosed, it is easy 
for another election authority TMj to calculate TMi’s decryption key Fi from the relation 
KiFi (mod φ(p1)) = KjFj (mod φ(p1)) where φ(p1) = p1 – 1 when p1 is a prime number, for 
example. In the following uKi, wHi, uK1---KP and wH1---HP are denoted as E(Ki, u), E(Hi, w), 
E(K*, u) and E(H*, w) respectively. 
 
data part
E(Ki, xr) = (xr)Ki (mod p1)
randomization part
E(Hi, r) = rHi (mod p2)
 
Fig. 3.3 Encrypted form of x 
 
 To repeatedly encrypt voter Vj’s vote vj to E({Ki, Hi}, vj), Vj generates its secret 
random number rj and asks election authorities TM1, ---, TMP to encrypt vjrj and rjLj; where 
{Lj, Zj} is secret encryption and decryption key pair of Vj, and  TMs cannot calculate vj from 
vjrj and rjLj, because rj is secret of Vj and the calculation of rj from rjLj is a discrete 
logarithm problem. Then TM1, ---, TMP repeatedly encrypt the pair {vjrj, rjLj}, i.e. calculate 
E(K*, vjrj) and E(H*, rjLj) by their encryption keys K1, ---, KP and H1, ---, HP, and finally Vj 
calculates E(H*, rjLj)Zj = E(H*, rj), and constructs E({K*, H*}, vj) as a pair {E(K*, vjrj), 
E(H*, rj)}. E({K*, H*}, vj) can be decrypted into vj by calculating E(K*, vjrj)F1---FP = 
(vjrj)(K1---KP)(F1---FP) = vjrj and E(H*, rj)(G1---GP) = rj(H1---HP)(G1---GP) = rj by decryption keys F1, --
-, FP and G1, ---, GP, and by dividing vjrj by rj.  
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 For the confirmation of correct encryptions of TMs, Vj asks TM1, ---, TMP to decrypt 
E(K*, (vjrj)Aj) and E(H*, rjBj), where {Aj, Bj} are secret random numbers of Vj. Here, TM1, -
--, TMP cannot decrypt E(K*, (vjrj)Aj) and E(H*, rjBj) into (vjrj)Aj and rjBj when they 
calculate E(K*, vjrj) and E(H*, rjLj) dishonestly, because they do not know Aj, Bj, vjrj or rj. 
Therefore although Ki and Hi of each TMi are secret, Vj can confirm the correctness of 
encryptions as same as it is using public keys. It is apparent that this encryption scheme is 
probabilistic and commutative. Fortunately, it is also homomorphic, e.g. E(K*, x1)E(K*, x2) 
= x1K1---KPx2K1---KP = E(K*, x1x2) and E(H*, y1)E(H*, y2) = y1H1---HPy2H1---HP = E(H*, y1y2). 
The generation process of re-encrypted form of vote vj as a pair of E(K*, vjrj) and E(H*, rj) 
 shown in Fig. 3.4. 
 
is
Voter Vj
 generate secret numbers
  rj, Aj, Bj, Lj and Zj 
  calculate {vjrj, rjLj}
 calculate
 {E(K*, vjrj), E(H*, rj)} and
 {E(K*, (vjrj)Aj), E(H*, rjBj)}
 confirms the correctness of 
 {(vjrj)Aj, rjBj}
Election authorities
{TM1, ---, TMP}
 encrypt {vjrj, rjLj} to 
 E(K*, vjrj) and E(H*, rjLj)
 decrypt
 {E(K*, (vjrj)Aj), E(H*, rjBj)} 
   to {(vjrj)Aj, rjBj}
 
Fig. 3.4 Re-encryption process of vote 
*, xxji)}. Because each TMi knows 
nly xxji, no one can know the decrypted form of {E(K*, xxj), E(H*, xxj)}. 
 
 
 In the above procedure, as Vj knows its secret random number rj, coercers can use 
this rj to identify Vj 's vote. To disable vote identification, Vj also multiplies its vote vj by 
random number xxj that is not known to anyone, where xxj = xxj1xxj2---xxjP. Namely, each 
TMi generates its secret random number xxji, and encrypts xxji by its encryption keys Ki and 
Hi i.e. calculates {E(Ki, xxji), E(Hi, xxji)} and asks other Tallying managers to calculate 
{E(K*, xxji), E(H*, xxji)}. Then by using the homomorphic property, {E(K*, xxj), E(H*, xxj)} 
is generated by multiplying P different {E(K*, xxji), E(H
o
For the confirmation of correct encryptions of xxj i.e. to confirm that E(K*, xxji) and 
E(H*, xxji) are the encrypted forms of the same number, Vj calculates {E(K*, xxji), E(H*, 
xxji)Bj} to ask TM1, ---, TMP to decrypt them i.e. to calculate E(K*, xxji)F1---FP = xxji and E(H*, 
xxji)BjG1---GP = xxjiBj, for randomly selected i, and from them Vj checks the consistency 
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between xxji and xxjiBj. When E(K*, xxji) and E(H*, xxji) are calculated dishonestly, TM1, ---, 
TMP cannot decrypt E(K*, xxji) and E(H*, xxji)Bj into xxji and xxjiBj because they do not know 
Bj. Because (P-1) remaining xxjis are still unknown to anyone except TMi, no one can know 
the decrypted form of xxj unless all TMs conspire, and Vj can calculate E({K*, H*}, vj) = 
{E(K*, vjrjxxj), E(H*, rjxxj)} while making rjxxj unknown to anyone. Here, to maintain the 
equality of two forms of xxj, i.e. xxj (mod p1) and xxj (mod p2), each xxji must be defined so 
that xxj is less than p1 and p2. Figure 3.5 describes the construction and attachment process 
of unknown random number. 
first authority TM1
encrypts {E(Ki, xxji), E(Hi, xxji)} to 
{E(Ki, E(K1, xxji), E(Hi, E(H1, xxji)}
each authority TMi
generates xxji and encrypts it 
to {E(Ki, xxji), E(Hi, xxji)}
last authority TMP
encrypts {E(KP-1, --- E(K1, xxji), E(HP-1, --- 
E(H1, xxji)} to {E(KP, --- E(K1, xxji) = E(K*, 
xxji), {E(HP, --- E(H1, xxji) = E(H*, xxji)
Voter Vj
calculates {E(K*,xxj1)---E(K*,xxjP) = E(K*, 
xxj), E(H*,xxj1)---E(H*,xxjP) = E(H*,xxj)}
 and verify xxji
 generates secret numbers
  rj, Aj, Bj, Lj and Zj 
  calculates {vjrj, rjLj},
 {E(K*, vjrj), E(H*, rj)} and
 {E(K*, (vjrj)Aj), E(H*, rjBj)}
 confirms the correctness of 
{E(K*, (vjrj)Aj), E(H*, rjBj)} and {E(K*, xxji),  
 E(H*, xxji)Bj)}
construct {E(K*, v
{TM1, ---, TMP}
 encrypts {vjrj, rjLj} to 
 E(K*, vjrj) and E(H*, rjLj)
 decrypts
 {E(K*, (vjrj)Aj), E(H*, rjBj)} 
    to {(vjrj)Aj, rjBj}
jCCjrjxxj), E(H*, rjxxj)}  
Fig. 3.5 Secret number rjxj unknown to anyone 
 
 Repeatedly signing mechanisms on re-encrypted forms can be implemented in the 
same way. However, each TMi can calculate signing keys {M(1)k, M(2)k} of other TMk when 
its verification keys {U(1)k, U(2)k} are disclosed from the relation M(1)k = M(1)iU(1)i/U(1)k and 
M(2)k = M(2)iU(2)i/U(2)k. Therefore, verification keys must be disclosed only after all votes are 
decrypted. In the proposed scheme all votes are put in bulletin board (BB), where a BB is a 
23 
 
Chapter 3: Security Components 
public broadcast channel with memories, and information sent to a BB is readable by anyone 
and at anytime. Then, no one can forge signatures on votes in BB even the signing keys are 
revealed i.e. before the disclosure of verification keys, no one knows all signing keys; and 
after the disclosure of verification keys, votes are already decrypted and cannot be modified. 
Here, Vj can confirm the correctness of signatures without knowing the verification keys in 
e same way as in the encryption processes. 
on is not necessary, 
ecause all CNs are unique and all of their encrypted forms are different. 
rs, ElGamal based schemes require complicated ZKP 
rocesses even if CNs are exploited. 
.1.4 Signature pairs on blinded tokens  
ity by S(X(2)*, Ttj), because no one except Vj knows S(X(2)*, Ttj) even after 
(X(1)*, Ttj) had been opened. 
 
th
 
 In Sec. 3.1.1 CNs are encrypted without being mixed with random numbers and P 
multiple independent election authorities repeatedly encrypt CNj simply into (CNj)K1--- KP by 
using their secret encryption keys K1, ---, KP. Here, probabilistic encrypti
b
 
 Probabilistic and commutative re-encryption schemes also can be constructed based 
on ElGamal or threshold ElGamal encryption. However, to identify dishonest managers 
without disclosing privacies of vote
p
 
3
 
 Voters can act without disclosing their identities while showing their eligibility by 
using tokens. Namely, voter Vj encrypts its token Tj to E(aj, Tj) by using its secret key aj, 
and while confirming the identity of Vj by usual means e.g. through an ID and a password of 
Vj, multiple mutually independent election managers TM1 --- TMP blindly sign on E(aj, Tj) 
[23] to generate two different sets i.e. {S(X(1)1, E(aj, Ttj)), ---, S(X(1)P, E(aj, Ttj))} = S(X(1)*, 
E(aj, Ttj)) and {S(X(2)1, E(aj, Ttj)), ---, S(X(2)P, E(aj, Ttj))} = S(X(2)*, E(aj, Ttj)) as shown in 
Fig. 3.6 by using their signing keys {X(1)1, X(1)2, ---, X(1)P} and {X(2)1, X(2)2, ---, X(2)P}, and 
Vj decrypts them into two unblinded sets of signed tokens i.e. {S(X(1)1, Ttj), ---, S(X(1)P, Ttj)} 
= S(X(1)*, Ttj) and {S(X(2)1, Ttj), ---, S(X(2)P, Ttj)} = S(X(2)*, Ttj). Then, because TMs had 
signed without knowing Ttj, Vj can show its eligibility for putting its vote without disclosing 
itself, by showing S(X(1)*, Ttj). Also only Vj can approve the registration of its vote while 
proving its eligibil
S
{S(X
(1)1
, E(a
j
, T
tj
)), ---, S(X
(1)P
, E(a
j
, T
tj
))} = S(X
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Fig. 3.6 Signature pairs on blinded tokens 
.2 Existing components 
.2.1 Mixnet like encryptions/decryptions and shuffles 
s. Figure 3.7 presents a schematic diagram of mixnet like 
ecryptions and shuffles. 
 
 
3
 
3
 
 The construction of encrypted confirmation numbers CNs by the technique of 
encryptions and shuffles by multiple mutually independent authorities was discussed in Sec. 
3.1.1. Whereas in order to decrypt all encrypted votes, mutually independent election 
authorities repeatedly perform decryptions and shuffles of votes by using their secret 
decryption keys. As like decryption mixnet, it also consists of a set of mix-severs (already 
which is written as mutually independent election authorities). Each mix-server processes a 
batch of incoming messages in a way that the outgoing messages are unlinkable to the 
incoming ones, and forwards the whole batch to the next mix-server in the mixnet. Incoming 
messages are anonymized by removing the messages’ encryption layers and by shuffling the 
order of each batch of messages. Here, multiple decryptions are executed in the order 
different from encryption
d
   Mix1    Mix2   MixP
... ..
.
E(K*, m 1)
E(K*, m 2)
E(K*, mN)
Mixnet like decryption shuffles
m2
mN
m1
..
 
Fig. 3.7 Mixnet like decryption shuffles 
e decryption algorithm can be described 
In
 
 As discussed in Sec. 3.1, Ki is the secret encryption key of the i-th stage of i-th mix-
server (i.e. election authority). Voter Vj encrypts its message (i.e. vote) into E(KP, E(KP-1, --
- E(K1, mj) --- )) by the encryption keys of P mutually independent authorities i.e. mix-
servers and send it to the authorities. Mixi with its secret decryption key Fi receives inputs 
as, E(Ki, E(Ki-1, --- E(K1, mj) --- )) from Mix i-1. Th
as follows.  
put E(KP, E(KP-1, --- E(K1, mj) --- ));  j = 1,…, N. 
25 
 
Chapter 3: Security Components 
    For i = 1,…, P; {where P is the no. of mix-servers involved in mixnet} 
For j = 1,…,N; {where N is the no. of voters participated in voting} 
Now E(KP, E(KP-1, --- E(K1, mj) --- )) is decrypted to E(KP-1, --- E(K1, mj) --- ). In 
lexicographically order, all quantities are decrypted in this way to obtain their decrypted 
form. Output: {mj}R, a batch of mixed messages that cannot be traced back to senders. 
ecryptions and shuffles according to the proposed cryptosystem of Sec. 3.1.3, requires the 
 here (source modified from [1]). 
3.2.2 B
 to ensure the consistency of content, or observers may 
simply rely on cryptographic signatures of the content and the redundancy of the servers, 
using, f
voters and their votes to 
chieve incoercibility [1]. The voting scheme proposed in this thesis uses both forms of BBs 
ctions and without any designated sections. 
3.2.3 Bl
n its token Ttj, 
D
voter to perform P encryptions
 
ulletin board (BB) 
 
To achieve the vote and voter verifiability requirements, the data of interactions 
among the entities are publicly disclosed in BB at every stage of the scheme. BB is a 
publicly accessible broadcast communication channel with memory. Any information that is 
exchanged among entities is stored in memory and readable by anyone. Consequently 
anyone can check its integrity i.e. data is only added and old data can not be changed or 
modified. In short, reliability of a BB stems from the fact that it is under constant public 
inspection [15]. BB can be implemented by multiple servers in order to protect it from 
attackers who may want to modify information in it. These servers may run a distributed 
Byzantine agreement protocol [33]
or example hash trees [16]. 
 
Existence of such a public BB is assumed in many previous works. Many e-voting 
protocols consider that the designated sections of a BB has the correspondence with 
authenticated voters i.e. only authenticated voters can access their designated sections to 
write data. Some voting schemes consider a special form of BB that does not contain any 
designated sections, in order to remove the traceability between 
a
i.e. with designated se
 
ind signature 
 
Signature pairs on blinded tokens discussed in Sec. 3.1.4 are constructed based on 
the blind signature mechanism. The blind signature protocol proposed in [23] is based on 
the RSA digital signature algorithm [24]. It is assumed that to get a signature o
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voter Vj encrypts Ttj to E(aj, Ttj) by using its secret encryption key aj. Here the public key is 
denoted as a pair (E, W) and the secret signing key is denoted as a number X. 
 
Voter
Tallying 
manager
E(aj, Ttj)
Blind Message
S(X, E(aj, Ttj))
Blindy Signed Message
S(X, Ttj)
Unblinded Signed Message
 
Fig. 3.8 Steps of RSA blind signature mechanism proposed in [23] 
 
ind signature protocol proposed in [23] then consists of the following three steps 
 and 
 the value: E(aj, Ttj) mod W. Vj sends E(aj, Ttj) to the Tallying manager TMi. The 
private key X to compute the value: S(X, E(aj, m)) mod W. Then TMi returns 
ation S = Ttj X mod n. This is exactly the verification 
lation for standard RSA signatures. It should be noted that TMi doesn’t know on which 
3.2.4 A
According to password selection strategy, Vj does not show its IDj and P/Wj pair to the 
 Bl
as shown in Fig. 3.8:  
Blinding: 
Vj picks its secret encryption key aj, which is a random integer between 0 and n,
computes
E(aj, Ttj) is the blinded token to be signed by TMi and not the original message i.e. Ttj. 
Signing: 
TMi uses its 
S(X, E(aj, Ttj)) to Vj. 
Unblinding: 
Vj extracts the signature: S(X, Ttj) mod W by using its secret decryption key bj. So, Vj ends 
up with a pair (Ttj, S) satisfying the equ
re
message Ttj it had actually signed [27]. 
 
nonymous authentication mechanism  
 
Anonymous authentication mechanism proposed in [20] enables voter Vj to be 
authenticated as authorized one without disclosing its identity, based on password selection 
strategy. According to this mechanism a single entity (or entities) determines whether Vj, 
who is characterized by its identifier IDj and password P/Wj pair, is an authorized one or not. 
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28 
 
he list or not. For 
etails, see [20] and the behavior of this mechanism is shown in Fig. 3.9. 
 
entity. Instead of showing an IDj and P/Wj pair, Vj finds its P/Wj in the password list, which 
is generated by the entity, and declares whether its P/Wj is included in t
d
single (or multiple) entity
For each item in D 
find its corresponding 
password P/W
Calculate random key K
Calculate p = E(p, K),
q = p XOR r
r : a random bit pattern
Register q to the 
password list P
Calculate r = E(r, K)
Authenticate Cj, 
when r' = r
Vj
Generate D a list of 
randomly selected IDs
Find q that corresponds to
Cj in P
 Calculate p' = E (p', K)
 p' : password of Cj
 Calculate r' = q XOR p'
 Calculate r' = E(r', K)
 
 Return r' to the TMs,
 when r' = r
D
P, K, r
r'
 
 
Fig. 3.9 Behavior of anonymous authentication mechanism 
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Configuration of the Voting Scheme 
 
This chapter describes the configurations of the voting scheme i.e. the involved 
entities, their roles and the overview of the scheme are presented here. 
 
4.1 Entities and their roles 
 
 Entities involved in the scheme are N voters Vj (j = 1,---,N), election authorities i.e. 
Voting manager VM, P (at least two) mutually independent Tallying managers TMi (i = 1,---
,P), Disruption detection manager DM and six public BBs that maintain authorized 
communication transcripts i.e. VoterList, TokenList, ConfNoList, ActiveTokenList, 
VotingPanel and TallyingPanel. Figure 4.1 depicts the configurations of individual BBs. By 
putting relevant information on several BBs, interactions among the entities at every stage of 
the election become publicly verifiable. The relationships among the entities are shown in 
Fig. 4.2. In the followings Vj is the j-th voter, vj is the vote of Vj, and CCj, Ttj and xxj are the 
CN, token and unknown random number assigned to Vj. IDj and P/Wj are the identifier and 
password of Vj. The roles of each entity and the descriptions of BBs are as follows: 
 
Voter Vj: Each Vj generates its encrypted vote E({K*, H*}, vjCCj) while combining it with 
its assigned confirmation number CNj i.e. E(K*, CNj), and then puts and approves it in 
VotingPanel. It has its own identifier (IDj) and password (P/Wj) that characterize Vj as 
unique, and two secret encryption and decryption key pairs {aj, gj}, and {Lj, Zj}. IDj and 
P/Wj pair proves the eligibility of Vj. Key pair {aj, gj} is used to acquire two different forms 
of signatures of all Tallying managers TMs on its token Ttj blindly i.e. S(X(1)*, Ttj) and 
S(X(2)*, Ttj), and key pairs {Lj, Zj} is used to ask TMs to encrypt vote vj without disclosing 
j itself. v
 
Voting manager VM: VM is responsible for authenticating voters, for assigning 
confirmation numbers CNs to voters, and for putting encrypted votes of voters in 
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VotingPanel. It also puts other data about voters and votes in VoterList, TokenList, 
ConfNoList, ActiveTokenList, and VotingPanel. VM can be constructed by multiple 
dependent entities to distribute its responsibility if necessary. 
ing and 
erification key pairs {{M(1)i, U(1)i}, {Q(1)i, W(1)i}} and {{M(2)i, U(2)i}, {Q(2)i, W(2)i}}. 
and 
hen inconsistencies are detected it identifies the entities that cause the inconsistencies. 
 
in
 
Tallying managers TMs: Mutually independent P (P ≥ two) TMs sign on blinded tokens, 
perform encryptions and shuffles of confirmation numbers CNs and votes, repeatedly sign 
on encrypted votes and encrypted CNs in VotingPanel, and perform decryptions and shuffles 
of votes in VotingPanel to compute the tally and to put results on TallyingPanel. For 
encryption and decryption of votes and CNs, each TMi has two encryption and decryption 
key pairs {Ki, Fi} and {Hi, Gi}. Also to sign on blinded token E(aj, Ttj), TMi has two 
signing and verification key pairs i.e. {X(1)i, B(1)i} and { X(2)i, B(2)i}, and to repeatedly sign 
on encrypted votes and encrypted CNs in two different forms, it has four secret sign
v
 
Disruption detection manager DM: DM detects inconsistent votes in TallyingPanel, 
w
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Fig. 4.1 Configurations of bulletin boards 
 
VoterList: VoterList enables audiences including voters themselves to know eligible voters 
and voters who have been registered i.e. who acquired signatures of Tallying managers TMs 
on their tokens. It consists of ID and token parts. ID part maintains IDs of eligible voters, 
and when Vj registers itself, Voting manager VM puts E(aj, Ttj), a token encrypted by voter 
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Vj, at the token part corresponding to Vj’s ID when Vj shows it to obtain TMs’ signatures on 
it as shown in Fig. 4.1 (a). However no one except voters themselves can know tokens on 
hich TMs had signed. 
ly, VM gives 
 to Vj while making the corresponding flag part used as shown in Fig. 4.1 (b). 
xj), E(H*, xxj)} to be 
osted here at random by Voting manager VM as shown in Fig. 4.1 (c). 
h their 
igned tokens acquire CNs, and VM is not misusing or adding any extra CN illegally. 
 
w
 
TokenList: TokenList consists of the token and used flag parts, and enables voters to acquire 
tokens without collision. The token part maintains tokens i.e. unique numbers prepared by 
Voting manager VM. When voter Vj picks token Ttj from TokenList anonymous
it
 
ConfNoList: It consists of CN and random number parts, and for N voters, N different 
confirmation number CNs and unknown random numbers are generated and each CN and 
random number pair {CCj, xxj} is encrypted to E(K*, CCj) and {E(K*, x
p
 
ActiveTokenList: It consists of the token and CN parts, and enables anyone to know 
anonymous Vj who had been assigned CNj in its encrypted form. The tj-th position of the 
token part maintains the first signed form of the tj-th token Ttj i.e. S(X(1)*, Ttj) of Vj who had 
acquired CNj. The corresponding CN part maintains encrypted CCj, CN assigned to the voter 
who obtains Ttj i.e. E(K*, CNj) as shown in Fig. 4.1 (d). Here, by comparing the items in 
ActiveTokenList, ConfNoList and VoterList, anyone can verify that only voters wit
s
Tj
Voting manager
TokenList
1st signed Tj
ActiveTokenList
enc. CNj
vote, CNj 2nd signed Tj
2 signed EKj(Tj)
IDj, EKj(Tj)
VotingPanelVoterList decryption shuffles
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Disruption det- finds liable
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j ,E
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v
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j
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Fig. 4.2 Relationships amo s of the scheme ng the entitie
 
VotingPanel: VotingPanel consists of the vote and the approval parts, and enables anyone to 
know encrypted votes approved by their voters. The vote part corresponding to the tj-th 
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position maintains two different signed forms of encrypted vote of the voter to whom the tj-
th token Ttj is assigned. Namely it maintains anonymous Vj’s encrypted vote vj repeatedly 
signed by two secret signing key pairs {M(1)i, Q(1)i} and {M(2)i, Q(2)i} of all TMi and 
encrypted CCj in the first signed form i.e. S({M(1)*, Q(1)*}, E({K*, H*}, vjCCj)), S({M(2)*, 
Q(2)*}, E({K*, H*}, vjCCj)) and S(M(1)*, E(K*, CCj)), and the approval part maintains the 
second signed form of Ttj i.e. S(X(2)*, Ttj) as shown in Fig. 4.1 (e). In the above, S({M(h)*, 
Q(h)*}, E({K*, H*}, x)) represents pair {S(M(h)*, E(K*, xr)), S(Q(h)*, E(H*, r))} for h = 1 and 
, provided that r is a secret random number used for encrypting x to E({K*, H*}, x)). 
le being shuffled to be put on TallyingPanel, no one can 
entify linkages between voters and their votes. 
.2 Overview of the scheme 
he 
lationships and the data flows among the modules of the scheme are shown in Fig. 4.3. 
ously authenticated voter Vj picks unique token Ttj while 
aintaining tokens collision free. 
 
ecret encryption key of Vj and  X(1)i and X(2)i are the signing keys of Tallying manager TMi. 
.2.3 Voting: This stage consists of two sub-stages. 
 
anager VM. Also, Vj 
2
 
TallyingPanel: TallyingPanel consists of the vote part and CN part and enables anyone to 
know the election results. It maintains decrypted data of VotingPanel i.e. the vote part 
maintains {S({M(1)*, Q(1)*}, vjCCj), S({M(2)*, Q(2)*}, vjCCj)} and the CN part maintains 
S(M(1)*, CCj) as shown in Fig. 4.1 (f). Based on CNs, anyone can verify that only and all 
votes from eligible voters are included in TallyingPanel. However, because votes on 
VotingPanel are decrypted whi
id
 
4
 
 The proposed voting scheme consists of five major stages as follows. T
re
 
4.2.1 Token acquisition: Anonym
m
 
4.2.2 Registration: Voter Vj whose eligibility is checked by its identifier IDj and password 
P/Wj pair obtains two kinds of blind signatures of Tallying managers on Ttj i.e. S(X(1)*, E(aj, 
Ttj)) and S(X(2)*, E(aj, Ttj)). Therefore later on Vj can prove its eligibility by showing 
decrypted signatures S(X(1)*, Ttj) and S(X(2)*, Ttj), without disclosing its identity. Here aj is a
s
 
4
CN Assignment: Vj proves its eligibility by showing S(X(1)*, Ttj) and obtains 
repeatedly encrypted confirmation number CCj i.e. E(K*, CCj) and encrypted 
unknown random number {E(K*, xxj), E(H*, xj)} from Voting m
32 
 
Chapter 4: Configuration of the Voting Scheme 
 
verifies the correctness of encryption of {E(K*, xxj), E(H*, xj)}. 
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Fig. 4.3 Relationships and data flow among the modules of the scheme 
e second form of their signatures i.e. calculate S({M(2)*, 
Q(2)*}, E({K*, H*}, vjCCj)). 
 
Vote Submission: Vj asks Tallying managers to repeatedly encrypt its vote vj to 
E({K*, H*}, vj) while randomizing it by secret numbers rj and xxj and verify its 
correctness. Then Vj calculates {E({K*, H*}, vjCCj), E(K*, CCj)} while combining 
E({K*, H*}, vj) with its assigned E(K*, CCj) and submits it as its vote, and TM1,---, 
TMP sign on them by the first form of their signatures i.e. calculate S({M(1)*, Q(1)*}, 
E({K*, H*}, vjCCj)) and S(M(1)*, E(K*, CCj)). After checking its vote on VotingPanel, 
Vj approves the registration of its vote by S(X(2)*, Ttj), and finally TM1,---,TMP sign 
on E({K*, H*}, vjCCj) by th
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owever CNs attached to individual votes ensure that all and only eligible votes are counted. 
ny disclosed vote, the responsible 
entity is detected while maintaining the privacy of voters. 
 
4.2.4 Tallying: Multiple decryptions and shuffles of votes in VotingPanel by Tallying 
managers compute the election results and they are disclosed on TallyingPanel while 
concealing links between encrypted and disclosed votes in VotingPanel and TallyingPanel. 
H
 
4.2.5 Disruption detection: If inconsistency is found for a
 Chapter 5 
 
Proposed Voting Scheme 
 
This Chapter describes the individual stages of the proposed voting scheme in detail. 
Here individual stages proceed as follows: 
 
5.1 Token acquisition stage 
 
ID1
ID2
. . .
IDj
. . .
IDN
VoterList
VM authenticates 
Vj anonymously 
(a)
Voting manager
 T1   unused
 T2   used  
 T3   unused
  . . .       
Tti   used
  . . .  
 TN   unused 
TokenList
(b)
Voter
Vj picks Ttj 
anonymously
 
 
Fig. 5.1 For eligible voter: (a) anonymous authentication, and (b) anonymously token 
acquisition procedures.  
 
An objective of this stage is to assign voter Vj a token Ttj which is unique in the 
system while maintaining anonymity of Vj. To achieve this objective, anonymously 
authenticated Vj picks Ttj from TokenList prepared by Voting manager VM. Because voters 
can pick tokens that are not picked by other voters, the uniqueness of tokens are maintained. 
Figure 5.1 (a) shows that VM anonymously authenticates voters in VoterList. Theoretically, 
Vj authentication is not necessary for this step. But by protecting Ttj from being picked by 
unauthorized entities, it becomes possible to make TokenList as small as possible i.e. 
unauthorized entities cannot request tokens. However, more than N different numbers are 
generated as tokens in advance and they are put in TokenList to be picked by voters; where 
N is the number of eligible voters. Fig. 5.1 (b) shows that Vj anonymously picks its Ttj from 
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TokenList.  
 
To enforce Vj to pick Ttj from TokenList, every Ttj has the signature of Voting 
manager VM (this signature is different from S(X(1)*, Ttj) and S(X(2)*, Ttj), and ensure that Ttj 
is picked from TokenList). Because of this signature, entities cannot misuse tokens in 
unauthorized ways. This signature is accomplished by the digital signature mechanism [24, 
25]. However tokens in TokenList are open to the public only in non-signed forms to disable 
entities to use them in unauthorized ways. It is possible to maintain privacies of voters even 
when they are involved in dishonest events as shown at the end of Sec. 5.5. 
 
In this stage, Vj and VM interact as follows: 
1. VM authenticates eligible Vj anonymously e.g. through anonymous authentication 
mechanism [20]. 
2. Authenticated Vj picks unused token Ttj from TokenList and asks VM to sign on Ttj 
(this signature is omitted in the following notations). 
3. In order to avoid collision, VM makes Ttj in TokenList used as shown in Fig. 5.1 (b). 
 
Security problems of this stage are token collision, firstly voters may get multiple tokens 
and VM may not issue tokens to eligible voters. 
These problems are solved as bellow: 
 
 Voters may get already picked tokens:  
Here the signature of VM on Ttj ensures that the token is picked from TokenList. 
Also the used mark on flag part of TokenList disable voters to get already picked 
tokens. 
 
 Voters may get multiple tokens:  
Because only tokens with signatures of Tallying managers, which are given at the 
registration stage while confirming the eligibility of individual voters, are effective, 
voters can use only single tokens even they get multiple tokens. 
 
 Voters may not get tokens:  
As multiple tokens cause no inconvenience, Vj can request its token assignment 
repeatedly. 
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5.2 Registration stage 
 
 Objectives of this stage are: (1) to let Tallying managers (TMs) sign on token Ttj that 
is shown by eligible voter Vj without knowing Ttj itself [23], so that Vj can show its 
eligibility anonymously by it at the later stages, and (2) to let all entities know signed Ttj 
that is assigned to Vj. Here the pair of signatures i.e. S(X(1)*, Ttj) and S(X(2)*, Ttj) are 
generated by TMs through the blind signature scheme [23], as described in Sec. 3.1.4. To 
make voters that obtain signed tokens publicly visible, VM maintains VoterList, as shown in 
Fig. 4.1 (a), but at this stage Vj shows Ttj in its blinded form, i.e. VM puts E(aj, Ttj) in 
VoterList. Therefore anyone can monitor Vj who is registered, however, only Vj knows its 
token Ttj. As a consequence, Vj can abstain from vote submission without being noticed 
even it is registered in VoterList for example. Figure 5.2 shows the interactions of this stage. 
 
 ID1 E(aj,Ttj)
 ID2        
 ...  E(aj,Tt9)
IDj        
... E(aj,Tt6)
 IDNE(aj,Tt1)
VoterList
Voter 
Voting manager 
2. Vj submits IDj, 
P/Wj and E(aj,Ttj) 
3. VM authenticates Vj 
and posts E(a
j
, T
tj
)
4. VM sends E(aj, Ttj) 
to TMs for signatures
Tallying managers 
1. Vj calculates 
E(aj,Ttj)
5. TMs sign and send 
E(aj,Ttj) in 2 different forms
6. Vj decrypts S(X(1)*, E(aj, Ttj)), S(X(2)*, 
E(a
j
, Ttj)) to S(X(1)*, Ttj), S(X(2)*, Ttj)
 
Fig. 5.2 Voter registration procedures 
 
The interactions between Vj and VM in this stage are as follows: 
1. Vj encrypts Ttj by using its secret encryption key Kj i.e. Vj calculates E(aj, Ttj). 
 
, Ttj). 
2. Vj shows its IDj, P/Wj and its blinded token E(aj, Ttj) to VM. 
3. VM authenticates Vj based on IDj and P/Wj and after the successful authentication, it 
posts E(aj, Ttj) in VoterList so that anyone can know the anonymous Vj who has 
registered. 
4. VM sends EKj(Ttj) to Tallying managers for their signatures, and mutually independent 
TM1,---,TMP sign on E(aj, Ttj) with their two different signatures i.e. calculate S(X(1)*, 
E(aj, Ttj)) and S(X(2)*, E(aj, Ttj)).
5. TM1,---,TMP send them to VM to be sent to Vj. 
6. Vj checks the validity of signatures on Ttj and decrypts S(X(1)*, E(aj, Ttj)) and S(X(2)*, 
E(aj, Ttj)) to S(X(1)*, Ttj) and S(X(2)*
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Here the third step ensures that ineligible Vj cannot obtain signed Ttj and eligible Vj cannot 
get multiple signed tokens. Also the fourth step ensures that anyone cannot forge signed 
tokens unless all Tallying managers conspire. Security problems of this stage are as follows: 
 
 Multiple entities request signatures on Ttj picked by voter Vj:  
By this threat, Vj's vote will be rejected. There are two possibilities, the  first one 
occurs when signed Ttj is stolen, however Vj is responsible for that. The other 
possibility is a case where VM uses signed Ttj. This possibility can be excluded, if 
necessary, by duplicating VM, i.e. no entity can obtain signatures of all TMs on Ttj in 
unauthorized ways unless all VMs conspire. 
 
 Voters cannot get correct signed tokens:  
Vj can prove VM's dishonesty by showing E(aj, Ttj) and the incorrect signed token. 
However these situations do not happen, because dishonesty of authorities are 
revealed. 
 
 Voting manager puts its forging E(aj, Ttj):  
Already discussed in the first security problem of this section, this dishonesty also 
can be protected by duplicating VM, i.e. forged blinded tokens cannot be accepted if 
at least one VM is honest. 
 
5.3 Voting stage 
 
 Objectives of this stage are: (1) to assign confirmation number CCj to anonymous 
voter Vj without knowing CCj itself, (2) to disclose used Ttj to the public, (3) to enable Vj to 
put its vote on VotingPanel while concealing its identity and vote, (4) to enable Vj to 
validate its vote on VotingPanel, and (5) to let Tallying managers TM1, ---, TMP sign on 
encrypted votes and encrypted CNs on VotingPanel. This stage consists of two sub-stages, 
which are: i) CN assignment and ii) Vote submission. 
 
5.3.1 CN assignment sub-stage  
 
 In this sub-stage: (1) Voting manager VM authenticates voter Vj anonymously by 
signed token S(X(1)*, Ttj), and (2) Vj receives encrypted CCj i.e. E(K*, CCj) and encrypted 
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unknown random number {E(K*, xxj), E(H*, xxj)}. While VM sends E(K*, CCj) to Vj, it also 
discloses E(K*, CCj) and S(X(1)*, Ttj) in ActiveTokenList. Here as shown in Sec 3.1.2, anyone 
even Vj itself cannot identify the correspondence between original CCj and E(K*, CCj), and 
hence between Vj and CCj. However, because CNs are unique and registered, and no one can 
forge signatures of all Tallying managers on them, any entity can confirm the accuracy of 
votes by CNs disclosed in TallyingPanel. Figure 5.3 shows the interactions of this sub-stage.  
 
Voter
Voting manager
1.Vj submits and VM 
checks S(X
(1)*
,Tj)
3. VM puts SigTi*(Tj) 
and E
T*
(CN
j
)
2. VM sends E(K*,CCj) and 
{E(K*,xxj), E(H*,xxj)} to Vj
 ActiveTokenList
 S(X(1)*,T1) E(K*,Cy)
.  .  .
. . .
token      CN
 S(X(1)*,Ttj)
 S(X(1)*,TN)
E(K*,CCj)
E(K
*
,Cs)
 
Fig. 5.3 CN assignment procedures 
 
The interactions between Vj and VM in this sub-stage are as follows: 
1. Vj submits S(X(1)*, Ttj) to VM and VM checks the validity of S(X(1)*, Ttj). Here VM can 
verify the authenticity of Vj by checking only the signatures on Ttj that is not used 
repeatedly. 
2. VM sends E(K*, CCj) and {E(K*, xxj), E(H*, xxj)} to Vj, and Vj checks the correctness of 
encryption of {E(K*, xxj), E(H*, xxj)}. 
 
j. 
rs. 
3. VM also puts S(X(1)*, Ttj) and E(K*, CCj) in ActiveTokenList as shown in Fig. 4.1 (d).
 
Security problems of this sub-stage are as follows: 
 Voting manager may put signed tokens in ActiveTokenList before voters:  
VM knows neither of Vj's secret key nor the signing keys of all Tallying managers, 
therefore it cannot generate S(X(1)*, Ttj) from S(X(1)*, E(aj, Ttj)) or Ttj to put it before 
Vj i.e. it is impossible for VM to generate and put S(X(1)*, Ttj) before V
 
 Voting manager may not put signed token in ActiveTokenList:  
VM cannot deny putting of S(X(1)*, Ttj) on ActiveTokenList because S(X(1)*, Ttj) has 
the signatures of Tallying manage
 
 Voting manager may not give CCj, or give incorrect CCj to Vj :  
As S(X(1)*, Ttj) is open to the public, VM cannot deny giving of CCj. Also as E(K*, 
 
 
39 
 
 
 
Chapter 5: Proposed Voting Scheme 
 
CCj) is open on ConfNoList, VM cannot give non-registered CCj. Although it is 
possible that TMs encrypt CCj incorrectly, this dishonesty and the responsible entities 
are detected at the disruption detection stage, therefore TMs cannot encrypt CNs 
incorrectly. 
 
5.3.2 Vote submission sub-stage  
 
 In this sub-stage: (1) anonymous voter Vj submits its verifiable secret vote, (2) 
Tallying managers TM1,---,TMP repeatedly sign on the vote, (3) after confirming the 
successful registration of the vote on VotingPanel, Vj approves its vote by putting the second 
signed form of Ttj i.e. S(X(2)*, Ttj) in VotingPanel as shown in Fig. 4.1 (e), and (4) finally 
TMs repeatedly sign on the vote by the second form of their signatures. Here, E(K*, vjrjxj) 
and E(H*, rjxxj) are computed as the product of E(K*, vjrj) and E(K*, xxj), and E(H*, rj) and 
E(H*, xxj) respectively, and vote E({K*, H*}, vjCCj) is constructed as the product of E(K*, 
vjrjxxj) and E(K*, CCj). As Vj asks Tallying managers to encrypt vjrj instead of vj while 
generating secret random number rj, TM1,---,TMP cannot know vj. Also encrypted vjrj is 
further multiplied by encrypted xxj, of which decrypted value is not known to anyone; 
therefore even Vj cannot identify its vote at the tallying stage. About the approval of votes, 
because no one except Vj knows S(X(2)*, Ttj) even after S(X(1)*, Ttj) had been disclosed, only 
Vj can approve its vote, consequently Vj cannot claim any dishonesty about its vote after its 
approval. Figure 5.4 depicts the steps of vote constructions; they proceed as follows: 
c 3.1.4. 
*, CCj)). 
 
1. Vj generates its secret random number rj to calculate vjrj and rjLj, and asks TM1, ---, 
TMP to encrypt them into E(K*, vjrj) and E(H*, rjLj). By using these results, Vj calculates 
E({K*, H*}, vj) = {E(K*, vjrj), E(H*, rj)} as described in Se
2. Vj verifies the correctness of encryption of E({K*, H*}, vj), and calculates E(K*, 
vjrj)E(K*, xxj) = E(K*, vjrjxxj) and E(H*, rj)E(H*, xxj) = E(H*, rjxxj). Then it multiplies E(K*, 
vjrjxxj) by its E(K*, CCj), i.e. calculates E(K*, vjrjxxj)E(K*, CCj) = E(K*, vjCCjrjxxj), and 
constructs its vote as E({K*, H*}, vjCCj) = {E(K*, vjCCjrjxxj), E(H*, rjxxj)}. 
3. Vj submits E({K*, H*}, vjCCj) and E(K*, CCj) as its vote and puts them on the position 
corresponding to Ttj in VotingPanel. 
4. TM1, ---, TMP repeatedly sign on E({K*, H*}, vjCCj) and E(K*, CCj) in VotingPanel by 
the first form of their signatures i.e. calculate S({M(1)*, Q(1)*}, E({K*, H*}, vjCCj)) and 
S(M(1)*, E(K
5. After confirming the correctness of signatures on its vote in VotingPanel, Vj submits 
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S(X(2)*, Ttj) to VM as its approval. 
6. TM1, ---, TMP repeatedly sign on E({K*, H*}, vjCCj)) by the second form of their 
signatures i.e. calculate S({M(2)*, Q(2)*}, E({K*, H*}, vjCCj)). Finally Vj verifies the 
signatures. 
 
TMs encrypt V
j
's vote as E(K
*
,v
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r
j
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j
 calculates E(K
*
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j
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) and verifies the encryptions
Vj approves its vote by submitting S(X(2)*,Ttj)
Vj generates rj to calculate vjrj and rjLj
Vj verifies the 2nd signatures  
Fig. 5.4 Vote construction procedures 
 
 and signatures i.e. S({M(1)*, Q(1)*}, vjCCj) and S({M(2)*, Q(2)*}, vjCCj)} 
are consistent. 
 
VM cannot deny putting. If VM puts incorrect vote, Vj can 
disapprove it. 
 
 
For this sub-stage security problems are as follows: 
Voters may submit invalid votes to disrupt the voting:  
Vj cannot claim that its vote is disrupted even its vote is meaningless when disclosed 
CCj is valid
 
Voting manager may not put vote or put incorrect vote on VotingPanel:  
As S(X(1)*, Ttj) is open to the public, Vj can repeatedly submit its vote before its 
approval, therefore 
 
Someone may disrupt votes in VotingPanel:  
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As VotingPanel is open to the public, no one can modify or delete votes without 
being detected. 
 
rectness of both forms of signatures of Tallying managers, 
therefore impossible. 
.4 Tallying stage 
. In this example, multiple decryptions 
are executed in the order different from encryptions. 
 
Tallying managers may sign both forms of their signatures incorrectly:  
Voter verifies the cor
 
5
 
 Objectives of this stage are to decrypt all encrypted votes in VotingPanel and to 
disclose the results on TallyingPanel while concealing links between voters and their votes. 
When the deadline of vote submission comes, mutually independent Tallying managers 
repeatedly perform decryptions and shuffles of votes by using their secret decryption keys to 
post the results on TallyingPanel, as shown in Fig. 5.5. In the figure, 3 Tallying managers 
TM2, TM1 and TM3 execute decryptions and shuffles
votes on TallyingPanel
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Fig. 5.5 Procedures in Tallying stage 
 
 
cannot forge S({M(2)*, Q(2)*}, vkCCj) consistently 
 
For this stage security problems are as follows:
Tallying managers may change votes:  
No one can generate two different forms of votes consistently unless all TMs 
conspire, and when votes are changed, responsible TMs are detected at the disruption 
detection stage based on this inconsistency. For example, although TMi can forge 
S({M(1)*, Q(1)*}, vkCCj) from S({M(1)*, Q(1)*}, vjCCj), S(M(1)*, CCj), S({M(1)*, Q(1)*}, 
vkCCk) and S(M(1)*, CCk), and replace S({M(1)*, Q(1)*}, vjCCj) by it based on the 
homomorphic property, TMi 
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because it does not know S(M(2)*, CCj). 
 
Anyone can detect the added votes by duplicated or by non registered CNs. 
 
n VotingPanel and TallyingPanel become different 
which is detectable by anyone. 
.5 Disruption detection stage 
 
 
Tallying managers may add votes:  
 
Tallying managers may delete votes:  
By this the numbers of votes o
 
5
“√” and “x” im respectivelyply consistent and inconsistent votes, 
√S({M(1)*,Q(1)*}, v2C18), S({M(2)*,Q(2)*}, v2C18) 
S({M(1)*,Q(1)*},vhC-10),S({M(2)*,Q(2)*},vhC-10)
x
x
x
x
 S(M(1)*,C18)
S(M(1)*, C2)
S(M(1)*,C-10)
S(M(1)*,C25)
S(M(1)*,C25)S({M(1)*, Q(1)*}, vaC25), S({M(2)*, Q(2)*}, vaC25)
S({M(1)*, Q(1)*}, vbC2), S({M(2)*, Q(2)*}, vaC2)
S({M(1)*, Q(1)*}, vbC25), S({M(2)*, Q(2)*}, vbC25)
 
Fig. 5.6 Possible vote disruptions 
 
rth and fifth votes (fourth and fifth 
rows) are also inconsistent because of duplicated CNs.  
If any inconsistency is found in TallyingPanel, Disruption detection manager DM 
detects liable entities. Figure 5.6 shows examples of consistent and inconsistent votes on 
TallyingPanel. The first vote (first row) is accepted because two different forms of vote 
v2CN18 are same and also CN18 is registered. The second vote (second row) is not consistent 
because the candidates within the two signed forms are different. The third vote (third row) 
is inconsistent because CN-10 is not registered. The fou
 
DM identifies the liable entities as follows. When an inconsistent vote vj is found, 
DM asks TMs to encrypt vj again in the reverse order of the tallying stage, namely each TMi 
encrypts vj and discloses the result with its input vote in the tallying stage that matches with 
vj. When this matching chain fails, the dishonest TMi is found. Here TMi cannot encrypt 
votes dishonestly because anyone can check the correctness of its encryption in the same 
way as in Sec. 3.1.4. Also when v had been submitted in the authorized way, dishonest 
managers are identified before the chain reaches VotingPanel. Therefore privacies of voters 
are maintained.  
 
 
 
43 
 
 
 
Chapter 5: Proposed Voting Scheme 
 
 
 
44 
 
 
 
 inconsistent votes and their voters because they can know the tokens from the 
voters. 
When DM detects the inconsistent votes in VotingPanel, the corresponding tokens 
are revealed, but as tokens are anonymous, voters are still anonymous. However, although 
this case does not occur as long as authorities are honest, coercers may know the links 
between
 Chapter 6 
 
Evaluation of the Scheme 
This chapter evaluates security performance of the proposed scheme for satisfying 
the requirements of e-voting systems. Also the computation volume is discussed based on 
simulation result of prototype system. 
 
6.1 Security analysis 
 
The proposed scheme satisfies the following requirements of e-voting. 
 
6.1.1 Eligibility 
 
 The eligibility of voters are checked by their ID and P/W pairs, and no one can forge 
the signatures on the tokens of voters as tokens possess the signatures of multiple mutually 
independent Tallying managers, therefore anyone cannot pretend authorized voters. Also as 
voters put their votes in the positions of VotingPanel corresponded to their tokens, multiple 
voting by a single voter is prevented. 
 
6.1.2 Privacy 
 
 Voters submit their votes without disclosing their identities i.e. anonymously while 
showing their signed tokens, therefore no one except voters themselves can know votes of 
individual voters. No one including the authorities can know voters who did not submit their 
votes either, although they are already registered in VoterList, because voters submit their 
votes anonymously by using tokens. 
 
6.1.3 Accuracy and universal verifiability 
 
 For obtaining tokens the eligibility of voters are checked by their ID and P/W pairs, 
and no one can forge signatures of multiple Tallying managers on their tokens, therefore any 
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unauthorized entity cannot put its vote. Also as voters put their votes in the positions of 
VotingPanel corresponded to their tokens, multiple voting is prevented. Moreover, 
uniqueness of registered CNs and signatures on votes and CNs ensure that all and only votes 
approved by individual voters are counted. 
 
6.1.4 Fairness 
 
 No single authority or entity can decrypt the interim voting results i.e. encrypted 
votes submitted by voters because votes on VotingPanel are repeatedly encrypted by 
multiple Tallying managers. 
 
6.1.5 Receipt-freeness 
 
 Voters know only their tokens, encrypted votes and encrypted CNs, and all of them 
cannot be linked to their votes in TallyingPanel. Also no one knows the correspondences 
between encrypted votes on VotingPanel and decrypted votes on TallyingPanel either, 
because of decryptions and shuffles of votes and CNs by multiple independent entities. 
Therefore the scheme is receipt-free.  
 
6.1.6 Incoercibility 
 
 When decrypted votes in two different signed forms are equivalent, no one can 
claim that votes are disrupted, it means that the vote is meaningless from the beginning of 
its submission. Therefore coercers cannot invalidate elections by claiming vote disruptions 
while forcing voters to submit disrupted votes, and thereby the scheme is secure against 
randomization attacks. Although coercers can bias or influence voters to submit invalid 
votes with specific patterns through write-in ballots which will reduce effective votes if 
there are pre-specified candidates, this issue is out of the scope of this research and merits 
significant research. However at least it is not a so serious problem for this scheme as it is so 
serious in paper based schemes (see Sec. 2.5.1) 
 
Although in VoterList, IDs of voters are open to the public, the abstention of 
registered voters cannot be identified because while vote submission, voters appear by using 
their anonymous signed tokens. Also receipt-freeness of the scheme disables coercers to 
identify voters who had put meaningless votes, therefore voters can abstain from elections 
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without being noticed by internal coercers e.g. authorities, therefore the scheme is free from 
forced abstention attacks.  
 
Also, the uniqueness of signed tokens that enable registered voters to prove their 
eligibilities, disable coercers to submit votes on behalf of voters, and protects the scheme 
from simulation attacks. 
 
6.1.7 Dispute-freeness 
 
 Publicly-verifiable data about interactions among entities on the BBs, signature 
pairs on votes and the disruption detection processes enable entities to resolve disputes. 
 
6.1.8 Robustness 
 
 Voters can disrupt only their votes by submitting invalid i.e. meaningless votes. 
Either Voting manager or multiple Tallying managers cannot disrupt votes. Because the 
correctness of votes in VotingPanel is ensured by individual voters’ approvals, and 
inconsistent votes and the liable entities are identified at the disruption detection stage. Also 
inconsistencies can be recovered by simply decrypting inconsistent votes again. 
 
6.1.9 Scalability 
 
 CNs simplify the computational requirements of individual entities e.g. voters, 
Tallying managers etc. while maintaining the total accuracy and the incoercibility of the 
election as demonstrated in Sec 6.2. 
 
6.1.10 Practicality 
 
 The scheme is based on weaker assumptions about trustworthiness regarding 
entities i.e. nothing can make the scheme unreliable unless multiple entities conspire. The 
scheme is consistent if at least one authority (Tallying manager) is honest among multiple 
authorities. The scheme does not assume any absolutely trustworthy authority.  
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6.2 Performance evaluation 
 
 A prototype system of the proposed scheme consists of three Tallying managers has 
been developed, and the computation times required for registration, voting and tallying are 
measured. Then the performances are compared with those of Scratch & Vote (S&V) [16] 
and Coercion-Resistant Voting (CRV) [31] which are available for comparisons. The 
environment consists of a 1.60 GHz CPU with 504 MBytes of RAM, and GMP [32] 1024 
bit modulus running on Windows XP is used for encryptions. The time required for 
registering a voter is 0.0471 secs, for generating a vote is 0.308 secs, and for tallying a vote 
is 0.171 secs. Regarding the tallying, 1000 votes can be counted within 171 secs (i.e. 0.171 
* 1,000 = 171), and this shows that the scheme is scalable and practical enough. 
 
Table 6.1. Computation time required by the proposed scheme 
 
Registration (m. secs) Voting (m. secs) Tallying (m. secs) 
Blinding 0.3 Vj’s encryption 3.0 Decryption 133.0 
Signing 45.0 TMs encryption 17.0 Verification 38.0 
Unblinding 1.8 Vj’s decryption 9.0 
Verification 108.0 
Signing 135.0 
 
Verification 36.0 
 
Total 47.1 Total 308.0 Total 171.0 
 
 The registration of voter Vj is comprised of token Ttj blinding, signnature pair 
generations of three TMs i.e. generating six different signatures on blinded Ttj, and 
unblinding of six signed blinded Ttj. Blinding a token takes 0.3 m. secs, signature pair 
generations takes 45.0 m. secs and unblinding takes 1.8 m. secs. Here it is assumed that 
encrypted CNs and encrypted unknown random numbers are prepared in advance, therefore 
their computation time is not considered. The construction of vote vj is comprised of the 
encryption of vj by Vj itself, three TMs’ triple encryptions of vj, Vj’s decryption of it, Vj’s 
verification of TMs’ encryptions of vj and xxji, TMs’ repeatedly signing on encrypted vote 
and CN and Vj’s verification of both forms of TMs’ signatures. The time required for Vj’s 
encryption of vj is 3.0 m. secs, TMs’ triple encryption is 17.0 m. secs, Vj’s decryption is 9.0 
m. secs, Vj’s verification of TMs’ encryptions of vj and xxji is 108.0 m. secs, TMs’ repeatedly 
signing on encrypted vote and CN is 135.0 m. secs, and Vj’s verification of both forms of 
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TMs’ signatures is 36.0 m. secs. The time for tallying is comprised of decryptions and 
shuffles and verifications of two signed forms of votes and single signed form of CNs. Time 
required for decryptions and shuffles is 133.0 m. secs and verifications is 38.0 m. secs. Table 
6.1 shows the computation time of each stage. 
 
Table 6.2. Computation time comparisons with other schemes 
 
 CPU Registration Voting Tallying 
Proposed scheme 1.6 GHz 0.0471 secs 0.308 secs 0.171 secs 
CRV 2.0 GHz - - 26 ~ 62 secs 
S&V 2.8 GHz - 1 ~ 2 min - 
 
As Table 6.2 shows, compared with CRV that rely on ZKP, CNs of the proposed 
scheme substantially reduced the computation times i.e. the time required for the tallying is 
reduced at least more than 100 times. In the table all computation times of all schemes do 
not include the communication time. Figure 6.1 shows the voting and tallying stage 
computation time comparisons with other schemes where 1 refers the proposed scheme and 
2 refers the other schemes i.e.  in (a) 2 is S&V and in (b) 2 is CRV. Here CRV adopts 
threshold (n, t) ElGamal as the base encryption algorithm while using five and three as n 
and t values, where n is the total number of authorities and t is the threshold. The tallying 
process of CRV is comprised of verification of votes by NIZKPs, shuffling of verified votes, 
elimination of duplicated votes, shuffling of votes with unique credentials, shuffling of 
encrypted credentials of registered voters, collision detections of registered credentials, 
separations of votes with invalid credentials, decryptions and tallying. 
 
 
(a) 
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(b) 
Fig. 6.1 Computation time comparison of voting and tallying stages where 1 is for the 
proposed scheme. In (a) 2 is for S&V and in (b) 2 is for CRV. 
 
 Among the above operations all shufflings are carried out by verifiable mixnets 
each consists of multiple Tallying managers. Although the computation volumes of 
individual encryptions/decryptions and shuffles included in these mixnets are the same as 
those in the proposed scheme, i.e. they are propotional to key lengths, verifiable features of 
the mixnets supportrd by NIZKP make the whole computations complicated, when 
compared with the proposed scheme supported by CNs. Different from the proposed scheme, 
in which each TMi executes multiplications corresponding to six decryptions for each vote, 
CRV requires huge number of multiplications for each vote to verify the correct behaviors 
of mixnets, i.e. to conduct each NIZKP process reliably usually about 80 times of challenges 
and responses are necessary each of which requires the same numbers of multiplications as 
encryptions and decryptions do. Also, the computation time required for tallying in the 
proposed scheme is strictly proportional to N, the number of voters, on the other hand that in 
CRV is the order of N2 because it must eliminate duplicated votes, although it is suppressed 
to the linear order by using hashtables. Because voters carry out voting processes 
interactively, time required for voting is not so serious as tallying, therefore CRV did not 
mention the time of voting. Regarding the proposed scheme, 0.308 secs can be considered 
practical and scalable enough also. Moreover, many processes can be carried out in parallel 
by multiple managers if required. S&V is a paper based cryptographic voting system that 
offers entirely paper- and pen-based ballot casting, therefore the voting procedure is 
comparatively time consuming. 
 
 Chapter 7 
 
Conclusions 
 
6.1 Conclusions 
 
 The proposed e-voting scheme achieves verifiability by involving registered and 
unique confirmation numbers CNs while disabling all entities including voters themselves to 
know the linkages between voters and their votes. Therefore, the scheme can satisfy all the 
essential requirements of e-voting e.g. privacy, accuracy, universal verifiability, fairness, 
receipt-freeness, incoercibility, dispute-freeness, robustness, scalability and practicality. 
Most importantly, while being supported by CNs, these are achieved in a simple and 
efficient way, e.g. no extra proof is required at any stage of the election to prove its 
verifiability. Also a pair of signatures on encrypted votes proves the authenticity of votes 
and the honesty of election authorities even when the decryption of encrypted votes reveal a 
disrupted or meaningless results. Moreover, a pair of signature on blinded tokens enable 
voters to act anonymously e.g. the participation of voters to submit their encrypted votes and 
to approve the correct registration of their encrypted votes on BB can be achieved without 
disclosing their usual identities. As a conclusion, unlike existing e-voting schemes with 
complicated ZKP, the simplified computational requirements of individual election entities 
make the scheme practical and scalable. 
 
6.2 Future works 
 
 The proposed e-voting scheme relies on the cryptosystem proposed in [22] in which 
all the encryption and decryption keys of all entities are secret. Also as discussed in Sec. 
3.1.3, for encryptions of votes, unknown random numbers etc. and signing on votes, CNs 
etc., voters need to interact with authorities in order to confirm their correctness. It increases 
the time required and computations and communication overheads of the scheme. A further 
investigation can be made in making probabilistic public key cryptosystem e.g. ElGamal 
[25] or Paillier [26] available. Thereby voters do not need to interact with authorities, they 
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can encrypt or verify the correctness of signatures on their data directly. 
 
 Regarding trustworthiness, the assumption of the scheme is that “among multiple 
authorities, at least single authority is trustworthy.” The scheme can be enhanced when all 
trusworthy entities are excluded. 
 
 The proposed scheme must be evaluated in more realistic environments where 
multiple authorities are distributed over different places, and many voters are involved. 
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